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BETTER THAN BASIC INCOME? LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND
THE REGULATION OF WORKING TIME
MATTHEW DIMICK*
ABSTRACT
Basic income has attracted the attention of academics, policy makers, and
politicians around the globe. Basic income—a no-strings-attached cash transfer
made to all citizens of a country, rich or poor—has been lauded as a plan to
eliminate poverty, reduce income inequality, redress imbalances in the labor
market, remedy the impending problem of mass technology-induced
unemployment—the “robot apocalypse”—and make possible meaningful lives for
those otherwise dependent on menial work in the labor market. It has also been
proposed as an efficient, nonpaternalistic, and stigma-free alternative to existing
welfare state policies. This Article compares basic income to an alternative policy
proposal: the regulation of maximum working hours in the labor market. This
Article contends that on nearly all of these virtues, working-time regulation does
better than, or at least as well as, basic income. In particular, working-time
regulation makes “free time” available to a broader array of individuals, also
addresses technological unemployment, and is much more conducive to pro-
environmental policies. Most importantly, it is more deeply egalitarian than basic
income, not only addressing income inequality but social inequality, as well.
Although basic income and working-time regulation are not necessarily
incompatible—indeed some have advocated the adoption of both policies—there
may be other factors that effectively render them policy substitutes. Specifically,
not only is working-time regulation more complementary to existing welfare-state
policy than is basic income, but—already in existence in the U.S. and most other
developed countries—it also does not face the challenges of political and
economic feasibility that confront basic income. Thus the choice and comparison
is a compelling one, of which legal, policy, and tax scholars should take note.
* Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. Direct correspondence
to: 618 John Lord O’Brian Hall, Buffalo, N.Y. 14260-1100. E-mail: mdimick@buffalo.edu. For
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Kristen Dimick, Frederick Gedicks, Nicole Hallet, Jim Rasband, Jack Schlegel, Matt Steilen, and
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For many ages to come the old Adam will be so strong in us that
everybody will need to do some work if he is to be contented. We shall do
more things for ourselves than is usual with the rich to-day, only too glad
to have small duties and tasks and routines. But beyond this, we shall
endeavour to spread the bread thin on the butter—to make what work
there is still to be done to be as widely shared as possible. Three-hour
shifts or a fifteen-hour week may put off the problem for a great while.
For three hours a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of
us!
John Maynard Keynes1
INTRODUCTION
As Vox journalist Dylan Matthews wrote, “Basic income is having a
moment.”  Basic income is an unconditional—no strings attached—cash transfer,2
made to all citizens or residents of a country. Once merely an academic idea,
today “[t]he governments of Finland, Ontario, and Utrecht are all launching tests
of the policy proposal.”  Moreover, “The charity GiveDirectly is set to give basic3
incomes to 6,000 people in Kenya, and the tech industry powerhouse Y
Combinator is funding an experiment evaluating the idea.”  In its largest advance4
to date, a basic income proposal was put to a referendum vote in Switzerland.5
Although the proposal failed, that such a plan was voted on at all is rather
momentous.6
Basic income has also captured the attention of politicians, policy wonks, and
other “thought leaders” outside the ivory tower.  Andy Stern—former head of the7
1. John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN
PERSUASION 321, 328-29 (3d ed. 2010). 
2. Dylan Matthews, Basic Income: The World’s Simplest Plan to End Poverty, Explained,
VOX (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2014/9/8/6003359/basic-income-negative-income-tax-
questions-explain [https://perma.cc/KA4W-MRNC].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Raphael Minder, Guaranteed Income for All? Switzerland’s Voters Say No Thanks, N.Y.
TIMES (June 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/europe/switzerland-swiss-vote-
basic-income.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/2CT6-AJJK]. 
6. Id. (noting “campaigners said the vote was a first step” and quoting an economics
professor who backed the initiative and stated that “[o]ne out of five people voted for the
unconditional basic income, so that is a success in itself”).
7. Basic income is not necessarily a new idea, however. Milton Friedman, the well-known
libertarian economist, was “[a]rguably the biggest popularizer” of a version of basic income.
Matthews, supra note 2. Martin Luther King, Jr. also advocated a guaranteed income. Id. Many
influential economists of previous decades have favored a basic income. Id. Even Presidents
Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter supported a “negative income tax”—a policy very similar to a
basic income—and this legislation even came close to passing through the legislature. Id.
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influential Service Employees International Union—recently wrote a book,
Raising the Floor, in which he made a major case for basic income.  Presidential8
candidate Bernie Sanders “expressed sympathy” for the idea, although he did not
endorse it.  Basic income was recently the subject of several articles and a debate9
in the New York Times  and appears regularly in the popular media.  Nobel-10 11
8. See generally ANDY STERN, RAISING THE FLOOR: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME CAN
RENEW OUR ECONOMY AND REBUILD THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016).
9. Matthews, supra note 2.
10. Farhad Manjoo, A Plan in Case Robots Take the Jobs: Give Everyone a Paycheck, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/technology/plan-to-fight-robot-
invasion-at-work-give-everyone-a-paycheck.html [https://perma.cc/3A9F-ZCTG]; Eduardo Porter,
A Universal Basic Income is a Poor Tool to Fight Poverty, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/economy/universal-basic-income-poverty.html
[https://perma.cc/P8A4-ASC4]; Eduardo Porter & Farhad Manjoo, A Future Without Jobs? Two
Views of the Changing Work Force, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/03/09/business/economy/a-future-without-jobs-two-views-of-the-changing-work-force.html
[https://perma.cc/9PWJ-8FPT]. 
11. See, e.g., Mike Konczal, These Policies Could Move America Toward a Universal Basic
Income, NATION (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/these-policies-could-move-
america-toward-a-universal-basic-income/ [https://perma.cc/Y3SX-S986]; Greg Ip, Revival of
Universal Basic Income Proposal Ignores Needs of Labor Force, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/revival-of-universal-basic-income-proposal-ignores-needs-of-labor-
force-1468429793 [https://perma.cc/LSZ3-46ZH]; Samuel Hammond, When the Welfare State Met
the Flat Tax, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 16, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/16/when-the-
welfare-state-met-the-flat-tax/ [https://perma.cc/6D3G-MVS7]; James Surowiecki, The Case for
Free Money: Why Don’t We Have Universal Basic Income?, NEW YORKER (June 20, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-basic-income
[https://perma.cc/MXS9-MSNS]; Noah Smith, Silicon Valley’s Basic-Income Experiment Is Worth
Watching, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 8, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-
08/silicon-valley-s-basic-income-experiment-is-worth-watching [https://perma.cc/8N77-BM24];
Perry Stein, Is a Basic Income Possible in D.C.? The City Is Looking Into It, WASH. POST (June 7,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2016/06/07/is-a-basic-income-possible-in-
d-c-the-city-is-looking-into-it/?utm_term=.614a8a8d150f [https://perma.cc/ZC3W-2JNL]; Will
Heilpern, How the Universal Basic Income Scheme Could Save Us When Robots Take Our Jobs,
BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/compass-universal-basic-income-
report-qa-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/8MTR-73KT]; Paul Solman, Why Universal Basic Income Isn’t
Going Away Any Time Soon, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 7, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
makin g- sense /wh y-u n iver s a l - b a s i c - i n c ome- i sn t -go ing-away-an y- t ime-so o n /
[https://perma.cc/EF48-8D26]; Megan McArdle, Universal Basic Income Is Ahead of Its Time (to
Say the Least), BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 6, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-
06-06/universal-basic-income-is-ahead-of-its-time-to-say-the-least [https://perma.cc/AQ8X-
DSYL]; Noah Gordon, The Conservative Case for a Guaranteed Basic Income, ATLANTIC (Apr.
6, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/why-arent-reformicons-pushing-a-
guaranteed-basic-income/375600/ [https://perma.cc/E8Y9-KGEP].
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prize winning economists have signaled their support for the policy.12
For supporters, basic income does several things: it eliminates poverty;
counters rising income inequality; non-paternalistically promotes freedom
because recipients are free to use their basic income in whatever way they deem
appropriate, in contrast to traditional means-tested and in-kind welfare state
policies; and it offers a solution to what many fear is the approaching apocalypse
of technological unemployment. Central to its appeal—and this Article—basic
income eliminates dependence on the labor market and makes possible
meaningful lives not dictated by market imperatives.
The goal of this Article is to compare basic income  with another policy: the13
regulation of working hours.  The novel contribution is that, despite initial14
impressions, both basic income and working-hours regulation have, surprisingly,
implications for an identical list of normative criteria. Both have consequences
for broad normative principles, such as enhancing individual liberty  and15
increasing social and economic equality.  But they also have implications for16
addressing more fine-grained issues such as technological unemployment,  the17
nature of work,  and the environment.  Because it is an important concern for18 19
political sustainability, basic income and working-hours regulation can also be
evaluated in terms of what is called their “universality.”  Thus, despite first20
appearances, basic income and working-hours regulation are quite normatively
comparable.
Besides this comparative analysis, this Article also contends that working-
time regulation is a superior alternative to basic income. Not only do basic
income and working-hours regulation fulfill similar normative aspirations, but
regulation possesses most, if not all, of the advantages of basic income and few
of its disadvantages.  In addition, the advantages of basic income are perhaps not21
as great as proponents believe. Furthermore, untested and untried to any serious
extent anywhere in the world, basic income faces very real issues of both
economic and political feasibility.  As an alternative to basic income, this Article22
proposes a simple extension of an already existing policy solution: the regulation
of maximum working hours.
This Article will compare basic income and working-hours regulation along
several dimensions. But one point of comparison deserves special mention:
12. Matthews, supra note 2 (“Nobel prize winning economists like Christopher Pissarides
and Joseph Stiglitz have gotten on board recently as well.”).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part III.D.
19. See infra Part III.G.
20. See infra Part III.E.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.D.
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equality. Basic income is almost always put forward as an egalitarian policy, one
that can directly, dramatically, and even efficiently redress poverty and economic
inequality.  Yet, although basic income may indeed ameliorate income23
inequality—though, as I will note, there are limitations here, too—it may actually
exacerbate social inequality. There is much more to equality than simply the
distribution of income. And in these aspects, basic income may do more harm
than good. In contrast, working-hours regulation will—perhaps surprisingly—do
much more to reduce social inequalities than will basic income. This claim may
constitute the strongest argument in favor of choosing the regulation of working
time over basic income.
Besides their overlooked comparability, there are several other reasons to
analyze basic income and working-time regulation in conjunction. One reason is
to contribute to a larger debate about the choice between the legal system and the
tax system to accomplish distributive or egalitarian objectives.  This choice24
comes in several versions, but they can be summarized by the sentiment that to
reduce inequality, markets should be left alone, and taxes and transfers should be
the sole means of redistribution. For example, the political philosopher John
Rawls wrote, “once a suitable minimum is provided by transfers, it may be
perfectly fair that the rest of total income be settled by the price system.”25
Similarly, in a famous article, legal economists Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell
make an efficiency argument that the tax system, rather than the legal system,
should be the sole method for redistributing income.  Basic income—a pure tax-26
and-transfer scheme—and working-hours regulation—a classic market regulating
mechanism—typify this choice. By demonstrating the advantages of working-
hours regulation, this Article challenges conventional wisdom and concludes that
the legal system can indeed be a more compelling choice than the tax system.
Another reason for comparing basic income and working-hours regulation is
that such a contrast contributes to the discussion about policy choice under
political and, specifically, democratic constraints. Much—especially
academic—discussion about policy is overly philosophical, focusing on
fundamental normative principles. But many non-normative constraints also
influence what policies are possible—not just desirable. These include political
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income
Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2004); Tomer
Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On The Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishing a Case for
Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1, 2 (2005); Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do
Anything About Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 28 (2016); Zachary
Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity
as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2480 & n.2 (2014); Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H.
McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor
Working Paper Series in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 713, 2015).
25. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971).
26. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994).
478 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:473
institutions, political capital, path dependencies, and institutional
complementarities, to name but a few. For example, as a large political literature
suggests, how countries regulate financial markets depends a lot on how they
regulate labor markets. Therefore, however much we may find a piece of
financial regulation normatively attractive, implementing that regulation may
depend—positively—on the nature of surrounding rules, institutions, and
interests.27
Basic income and working-time regulation gives us a good example of this
problem. On an abstract philosophical level, these policies are not necessarily
substitutes. That is, there is no particular normative reason why a country could
not have both basic income and stricter regulation of working time. Indeed, there
are some authors who have argued precisely for both.  Nevertheless, real-world,28
existing constraints—limits in political capital, political feasibility, path
dependency, etc.—may make such a choice necessary. In particular, basic income
represents a quite novel, “disruptive” and “post-industrial” approach to welfare
reform. Working-time regulation—which in some fashion already exists in every
developed country—is far more consistent with welfare-state policy as it
currently exists. Consequently, basic income may generate substantial tensions
with the existing institutional environment of mature welfare states. To the extent
that this is true—and makes each policy institutional if not normative
substitutes—this Article offers some reasons for why working-time regulation can
be preferred to basic income. Furthermore, this Article should not be read as a
rejection of basic income as a policy proposal by itself. As will be seen, there is
much to be said in favor of basic income. Nevertheless, the choice becomes
relevant and compelling in light of both the possibility of institutional constraints
and the fact that basic income and working-hours regulation address similar
normative objectives across a number of dimensions.
Part I of this Article surveys a basic income proposal and explores the
parameters of the basic-income idea and how it differs from other welfare-state
and tax-and-transfer policies. Part II discusses working-time regulation as it
currently exists, explores its history—which will illuminate the sometimes
changing normative justifications for working-hours regulation—and examines
proposals for extension and reform. Part III constitutes the main analysis of the
Article. It investigates the comparability of basic income and working-hours
regulation along seven different dimensions: (1) the implications of each proposal
for individual liberty, (2) their consequences for equality, (3) the ways they
address the problem of technological unemployment, (4) how each policy impacts
27. This approach to studying basic income draws the same distinction and observation made
by Ian Shapiro about the study of democracy. He writes, “Normative and explanatory theories of
democracy grow out of literatures that proceed, for the most part, on separate tracks, largely
uninformed by one another. This is unfortunate, partly because speculation about what ought to be
is likely to be more useful when informed by relevant knowledge of what is feasible . . . .” IAN
SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 2 (2009). 
28. See, e.g., RUTGER BREGMAN, UTOPIA FOR REALISTS: THE CASE FOR A UNIVERSAL BASIC
INCOME, OPEN BORDERS, AND A 15-HOUR WORKWEEK (2016).
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the employment relationship, (5) how “universal” each policy is, (6) how
economically efficient each proposal is, and (7) each policy’s implication for the
environment. Following this analysis, the Article concludes.
I. A  BASIC INCOME PROPOSAL
Philippe Van Parijs, perhaps the best-known academic advocate of basic
income, defines it as “an income paid by a political community to all its members
on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement.”  As income it29
is paid in cash, rather than in kind, “without any restrictions as to the nature or
timing of the consumption or investment it helps fund.”  This is a contrast to30
current welfare policy which, through food stamps or housing grants, effectively
provides benefits in kind. Another distinctive feature of this income grant is that
it is paid on some regular basis, rather than as a one-time endowment.31
A basic income is paid by some political community. However, this entity
need not be a nation state.  For example, it could be paid by a sub-national32
political unit (e.g., Alaska rather than the U.S. Government) or a supra-national
political unit (e.g., the European Union).  Furthermore, it need not be paid out33
of tax revenues.  For instance, financing basic income could be done out of a34
sovereign wealth fund (e.g., Alaska again, which pays a dividend scheme funded
out of part of the return on a diversified investment fund financed by royalties on
Alaskan oil fields ).35
Basic income is also paid to “all of its members.”  How inclusive the36
29. Philippe Van Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First
Century, in REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS
CORNERSTONES FOR AN EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 3, 4 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 2006) [hereinafter
REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION].
30. Id.
31. Id. For a useful comparison of basic income with a one-time endowment, namely, a so-
called “stakeholding” scheme, see Bruce A. Ackerman & Anne Alstott, Why Stakeholding?, in
REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION, supra note 29, at 43. 
32. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 5.
33. Id. at 5-6.
34. Id. at 6. On financing, see Charles M. A. Clark, The Economics of Poverty in the United
States of America, 4 OIKONOMIA: J. ETHICS & SOC. SCI. 6 (2005); A. B. ATKINSON, PUBLIC
ECONOMICS IN ACTION: THE BASIC INCOME/FLAT TAX PROPOSAL (1995); Shinji Murakami, The
Financial Feasibility of Basic Income and the Idea of a Refundable Tax Credit in Japan, in BASIC
INCOME IN JAPAN: PROSPECTS FOR A RADICAL IDEA IN A TRANSFORMING WELFARE (Y.
Vanderborght & T. Yamamori eds., 2014); Jordi Arcarons et al., Feasibility of Financing a Basic
Income, 9 BASIC INCOME STUDIES 79 (2014).
35. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 6. See also MICHAEL WAYNE HOWARD & KARL
WIDERQUIST, ALASKA’S PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND: EXAMINING ITS SUITABILITY AS A MODEL
(2012).
36. Van Parijs, supra note 29.
480 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:473
definition of “member” or “citizen” is open to some debate.  Some would restrict37
the benefit to citizens in the strict legal sense. Others argue that “members”
should include all legal permanent residents. Another issue is the age level at
which recipients should qualify.  Should children or pensioners be entitled to38
basic income? Often, the answers to these questions depend on the more
subsidiary goals of what is desired from a basic income. Suffice it to say that the
concept of “citizen,” even in its most restricted sense, is a fairly broad category,
consistent with basic income’s “universal” aspirations. Finally, basic income is
paid to each member on an individual basis and does not depend on household
size.  That is, there is no downward adjustment in the size of the transfer if, for39
instance, members are part of a larger household, in recognition of the fact that
the per capita cost of living is smaller in larger households. This is one feature
that distinguishes basic income from otherwise closely-related proposals for
guaranteed minimum income.40
Central to the idea of basic income is its claim to universality.  As such,41
basic income is not conditioned on one’s level of income, and rich and poor alike
receive it in the same amount. This is another feature that distinguishes basic
income from both the guaranteed minimum income and negative income tax
proposals. Each of these proposals is means tested: receiving a cash transfer
depends on having prior income below some designated threshold.  Although the42
rich receive transfers, basic income will not make the rich richer since, at least
given current tax-and-benefit systems, the relatively rich will be paying both for
their own basic income as well as that of the poor.  Furthermore, advocates have43
pointed out reasons for why it is better for both the poor and the rich to receive
basic income.  For one, universality improves take-up rates by removing44
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id. at 21 (“[U]nlike most existing guaranteed minimum income schemes, basic income
is meant to be strictly individual.”).
41. Id. at 8-9.
42. A negative income tax is often specified such that each and every individual is entitled
to a “demogrant” of a fixed amount. Id. However, depending on the tax schedule, this will operate
as a net benefit, in which case the individual receives a refundable credit, or only as a reduction in
income tax paid, in which case the individual receives nothing other than the lower tax liability.
Thus, as Van Parijs writes, 
In this sense, existing schemes operate ex post, on the basis of a prior assessment, be it
provisional, of the beneficiaries’ income. A basic income scheme, instead, operates ex
ante, irrespective of any income test. The benefit is given in full to those whose income
exceeds the stipulated minimum no less than to those whose income falls short of it.
Id. at 9; see also Pertti Honkanen, Basic Income and Negative Income Tax: A Comparison with a
Simulation Model, 9 BASIC INCOME STUD. 119 (2014).
43. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 9-10.
44. Id. at 10.
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administrative obstacles that exist under means-tested benefits.  Perhaps more45
pointedly, universality implies that “there is nothing humiliating about benefits
given to all as a matter of citizenship.”  Thus, universality removes the social46
stigma from accepting transfers, as well as presumably increasing political
support for it.47
Just as receiving basic income does not require satisfying a means or income
test, it is also not conditioned on any work requirement.  Unlike the Earned48
Income Tax Credit in the United States or the Working Families Tax Credit in the
United Kingdom, receiving basic income does not require the performance of any
work.  In fact, basic income does not even require demonstrating a willingness49
to work nor, as proposed in some participation income proposals, the fulfillment
of some broader notion of social contribution, such as employment, education,
training, job search, or home care for children or elderly.50
II. A  WORKING-TIME REGULATION PROPOSAL
In contrast to basic income, working-time regulation is not a relatively
untested policy proposal. In fact, overtime regulation is a central feature of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), the same New Deal act that establishes
federal minimum wage standards.  This Part will give a brief overview of the51
FLSA’s overtime provisions, some useful history behind them, and then a
discussion of current proposals to amend and expand these provisions.
A. The FLSA’s Overtime Provisions
Section 207 of the FLSA mandates that employers pay their employees one-
and-one-half times employees' regular rate of pay for any hours worked in excess
of forty in a single week.  There are several features to observe of this52
requirement. First, note that it does not, strictly speaking, establish a “maximum”
number of hours for an employee’s workweek.  Rather, an employee may work53
any number of feasible hours in a workweek, so long as the employer
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also Carole Pateman, Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a Basic
Income, 32 POL. & SOC. 89 (2004).
47. See infra Part III.E for a discussion on why this is in fact an assumption about this feature
of basic income and one that should be subject to criticism.
48. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 13-14.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 13-14. See also Simon Birnbaum, Should Surfers Be Ostracized? Basic Income,
Liberal Neutrality, and the Work Ethos, 10 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 396 (2011); Philippe Van Parijs,
Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income, 20 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 101 (1991).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
52. Id. § 207.
53. MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 779 (3d ed. 2015).
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compensates her at a higher rate for hours above forty.  At the same time, the54
higher costs of paying workers above the forty-hour standard creates a financial
incentive for employers to keep work hours below this level and to hire additional
workers instead.55
Second, note that workers entitled to overtime are owed compensation that
is one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay and not, for example, one-and-
one-half times the minimum wage.  For workers paid on an hourly basis, the56
regular rate of pay is simply the hourly wage.  For workers paid on salary,57
commission, piece rate, or other basis, the “regular rate is computed by dividing
the employee’s total weekly remuneration for a workweek by the number of
hours actually worked during the week.”58
Third, certain “white collar” employees are exempted from the FLSA’s
overtime provisions.  Although “white collar” is not a phrase used in the FLSA,59
it is a shorthand, encompassing term for the specific exemptions for executive,
administrative, professional, and outside salespersons.  There are several60
rationales for these exemptions. First, hourly compensation and overtime pay
were considered inappropriate or incompatible with the middle- and upper-class
status associated with these white collar positions.  Second, such workers were61
believed to have sufficient autonomy and bargaining power that they did not
require protection from the FLSA.  Finally, it was also believed that the nature62
of this white collar work made it difficult to standardize and spread to other
workers.63
B. Historical Origins of Working-Time Regulation
The history of the FLSA’s overtime provisions will inform the evaluative
discussion that follows in Part III. “Maximum hours labor standards arose from
the ‘short hours movements’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The short hours movements were a major source of worker solidarity and growth
of the United States labor movement . . . .”  The labor movement’s struggle for64
shorter hours was the expression of a desire to “work less and live more”—a
54. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
55. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 808.
56. Id. at 779.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
60. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 803.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 7 (2001). For
more history of the ‘short hours movement,’ see WILLIAM A. MIROLA, REDEEMING TIME:
PROTESTANTISM AND CHICAGO’S EIGHT-HOUR MOVEMENT, 1866-1912 (2015); and ANTONY
EVELYN ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (1971).
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“desire for personal freedom (time) from industrial order, and freedom for home
life and cultural matters outside wage and job concerns.”65
Several of the American labor movement’s bloodiest and most well-known
strikes emerged from the short hours movement. In 1886, Samuel Gompers,
leader of the predecessor to the American Federation of Labor, called for a
nationwide strike to take place on May 1 of that year.  The objective of the66
national strike was to achieve a shorter workweek—“ten hours’ pay for eight
hours’ work.”  The police violence that occurred during the May 1 strike led to67
a rally on May 4, 1886, later known as the Haymarket riot or massacre.  During68
the Haymarket riot, several police officers were killed, and several labor
movement activists were later convicted and executed.  Since then, May 1 has69
been considered the “international” workers’ or labor day around much of the
world.70
Although one initial motive for working-time regulation was shorter hours
and greater personal freedom, the onset of the Great Depression, decades after the
campaign’s initiation and the Haymarket events, created new and additional
rationales.  The Depression witnessed a dramatic increase in unemployment, and71
work-time regulation came to be seen as a solution. By shortening working hours,
employers would be forced to hire more workers in order to satisfy demand-
driven production requirements. Thus, not only could work-hours regulation
create more leisure time for workers, but it could also create more work
opportunities for those struggling to find a job.72
Scholars and historians appear to agree that the FLSA was only a partial
victory for the labor movements’ shorter hours objectives.  Although during the73
65. Miller, supra note 64.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id.  
70. See generally PHILIP S. FONER, MAY DAY: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKERS’ HOLIDAY, 1886-1986 (1986).
71. Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal
Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2223 (1998) (explaining that protecting workers’ health
was the primary objective of pre-New Deal hours regulation while job creation or “work-spreading”
was the central policy goal of the New Deal’s hours policy); Juliet Schor, Worktime in
Contemporary Context: Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157, 163
(1994) (“When the Depression hit, worktime reduction, or worksharing, became a very popular
solution.”).
72. SANG-HEON LEE ET AL., WORKING TIME AROUND THE WORLD: TRENDS IN WORKING
HOURS, LAWS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (2007).
73. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64, at 24 (“The FLSA linkage of wages with hours as an
‘either/or choice’ signaled an ideological and rhetorical shift in the debate regarding labor and
capital.”); Schor, supra note 71, at 164 (“[T]he passage of the FLSA showed that ‘the forces behind
share the work and the continuation of the progressive shortening of the hours of labor had been
routed.’”) (quoting BENJAMIN KLINE HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END: ABANDONING SHORTER
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Great Depression the labor movement supported worktime reductions, both as a
way to promote greater leisure and reduce unemployment, other social interests
had alternative solutions. For business interests, another way to address
unemployment was to increase consumption.  Increased productivity can74
potentially increase leisure, as basic needs can be more easily satisfied; however,
it can also be used to create new goods and services, the increasing demand for
which would fuel growth in employment.
As told by several scholars, these competing visions shaped the story of the
passage of the FLSA. According to Professor Juliet Schor, “The 30-hour week
was the primary unemployment measure advocated by the American Federation
of Labor.”  Legislative support for this vision came in 1933, when the Senate75
passed Hugo Black’s worktime reduction bill, which mandated thirty-hour
workweeks.  Initially supportive of such measures, President Roosevelt reversed76
himself as business pressures mounted.  The resulting FLSA only weakly77
reflected labors’ concerns: It did not set maximum hour limits, but only
established a financial disincentive for longer hours; it did not address vacations
or other time off; did not institute any provisions for future changes in
productivity or working time; and omitted a substantial fraction of the workforce
from its coverage.78
C. Proposals for Reform
It will not be necessary to give a concrete proposal for reforming working-
hours regulation. As will be made clearer in the subsequent analysis, what is
important is that reform increases workers’ opportunity for leisure, contributes
to the creation of additional employment, and, despite the reduction in hours
worked, it entails little or no reduction in pay, especially for workers at the
bottom of the income scale. There are several methods for accomplishing these
objectives. As will be illustrated, some particular concerns call for more specific
prescriptions.
To give shape to the discussion, this Article will summarize the
recommendations of Professor Schor.  Professor Schor has been an articulate79
advocate for reforming and amending the FLSA. She advocates several important
changes. Her first proposal is to reduce the standard forty-hour workweek (she
envisions instead a thirty-two-hour workweek) and eliminate premium pay for
overtime work.  In place of premium pay, she would implement a system of80
compensated time, or “comp time,” which would give employees time off at a
HOURS FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK 247 (1988)).
74. Schor, supra note 71, at 162-63.
75. Id. at 163.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 164.
79. These proposals can be found in Schor, supra note 71, at 164-71.
80. Id. at 167-68.
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rate of time and a half for overtime.  Comp time is already an established81
practice in the public sector, where it reflects a policy preference for leisure over
consumption.  Second, Schor proposes that employers allow workers to trade82
income for time.  For instance, employees could forego the opportunity for83
annual raises or could reduce current compensation in exchange for “shorter daily
hours, the ‘buying’ of vacation days, a four-day week, ten-month schedules and
sabbaticals.”84
A third area of reform would be to tighten, or even eliminate, the so-called
“white collar” exemptions in the FLSA.  Schor proposes covering all salaried85
employees, but allowing employers to exempt some of these employees (the “top
20%” of the workforce), while requiring them to designate an alternative standard
of weekly and annual hours for this group (she suggests that employers be free
“to set any standard below 60 hours a week and 2880 hours per year”).  This86
proposal would reduce overtime work for salaried employees as well as employer
abuse of that designation, while also recognizing the greater flexibility required
for high-level, white-collar employees.  Schor also proposes legislation to87
sanction employers who discriminate against employees who express preferences
or choose to work shorter hours.  Finally, to forestall any reduction in pay, Schor88
would increase the minimum wage.89
III. A  COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF BASIC INCOME AND
WORKING-TIME REGULATION
A. Liberty
One of the main arguments in favor of basic income is that it enhances
individual liberty. Van Parijs is perhaps the most articulate representative of this
perspective. He argues that “a defensible liberal conception of social justice . . .
must maximin . . . people’s real freedom, that is, the means they require for the
pursuit of their conception of the good life, whatever that is.”  Van Parijs further90
argues that “a defensible liberal theory of justice, that is, one that is truly
committed to an equal concern for all and to nondiscrimination among
conceptions of the good life, does justify, under appropriate factual conditions,
81. Id. at 167.
82. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 780.
83. Schor, supra note 71, at 168-70.
84. Id. at 168.
85. Id. at 170-71.
86. Id. at 170.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 171.
89. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE
151 (1991).
90. Van Parijs, supra note 50, at 103. “By ‘maximin’ I mean that a strong priority is being
given to the real freedom of those with the least amount of real freedom.” Id.
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a substantial unconditional basic income.”  In this section, this Article91
summarizes Van Parijs’s liberal theory of basic income, and then compares
effects of basic income on individual liberty with effects of working-hours
regulation.
Van Parijs takes as his starting position the liberal theory of John Rawls.92
According to Rawls’s Difference Principle, socioeconomic advantages should be
maximinned, that is, should be “distributed in such a way that the least
advantaged end up with at least as many advantages as the least advantaged
would end up with under any alternative arrangement.”  But what is among the93
set of “socioeconomic advantages” that should be maximinned? Van Parijs first
notes that if the Difference Principle were to maximin only income, then an
unconditional basic income may not be justified, since “some sort of conditional
transfer system would, in many circumstances, perform better than an
unconditional basic income.”  However, Van Parijs, as well as Rawls, mention94
several other forms of socioeconomic advantages, including “wealth,”  the95
“powers and prerogatives attached to social positions,”  and the “social bases of96
self-respect.”  Like basic income and unlike ordinary income, wealth is97
unconditional and is not (directly) a return for labor or capital services. Basic
income therefore promotes the maximinning of wealth.  Furthermore, because98
an unconditional basic income reduces an individual’s dependency on paid
employment, it “confers upon the weakest more bargaining power in their
dealings with both potential employers and the state.”  This more substantial99
bargaining power gives individuals a stronger likelihood of securing for
themselves greater powers and prerogatives attaching to their social positions.
Finally, a welfare system that requires a means test or the demonstration of an
inability to work forces individuals to show themselves “inadequate.”  This100
demonstration tends to stigmatize, humiliate, and otherwise undermine the
recipients’ self-respect. An unconditional basic income—received by all,
regardless of income, requiring neither a willingness nor an ability to
work—supposedly avoids these stigmatizing features of the modern welfare state
and therefore promotes self-respect.
Although not central to his Rawlsian defense of basic income, it is clear that
a—perhaps the—central appeal of basic income for Van Parijs (and others) is the
way it can enhance leisure for certain individuals.  His motivating example,101
91. Id. at 102.
92. Id. at 103.
93. Id. at 104.
94. Id. 
95. Id.
96. Id. at 104-05.
97. Id. at 105.
98. Id. at 104.
99. Id. at 105.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 108-12.
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included in the introduction and title of the article in which he makes this case,
is the “lazy surfer.”  There are some individuals who prefer to surf all day and102
find paid work in the market to be too onerous.  Other kinds of individuals103
would fall into a similar category. For example, persons whose only joy is
producing artwork for which there is no public interest or purchasing market.
Although Van Parijs’ liberal argument for basic income does not include leisure
in the index of primary goods,  a basic income that distributes wealth and104
confers bargaining power certainly makes such lives possible. It is clear that
providing a means of sustenance to those who would prefer such lives of leisure
is the motivating force behind Van Parijs’ argument. Thus, maximinning leisure
is not a justification for basic income, but it is a crucial implication of the socio-
economic advantages that should be maximinned.
Based on this interpretation of the Difference Principle, Van Parijs concludes
that “one should introduce a wealth-distributing, power-conferring, self-respect-
preserving unconditional basic income, indeed, that one should introduce such an
income at the highest sustainable level.”  However, Van Parijs does address one105
major objection: Basic income discriminates in favor of individuals who have a
particular—even expensive—taste for leisure.  When moving to a basic income106
scheme, the welfare of those who have small material needs and prefer a lot of
leisure are made substantially better off than those who prefer to work and have
a high level of material needs.  Under some standard interpretations, basic107
income therefore represents an—illiberal—bias in favor of the “lazy.”108
Van Parijs considers several possible answers to this objection before settling
on the following reasoning.  This reasoning is derived from Ronald Dworkin’s109
notion of equality of external resources.  Individuals require certain resources110
that are external to their talents (for instance, land) to achieve their preferred
income or living standards.  These external resources could be allocated equally111
among all individuals—and this would constitute one nondiscriminatory means
of allocating them.  But different individuals—indeed those who prefer more112
or less leisure—might want more or fewer external resources to achieve their
preferred allocation of income and leisure.  Those who prefer leisure may be113
102. See id. at 101-02, 130-31.
103. See id. at 108-12.
104. For reasons why Van Parijs does not include leisure as a primary good, see id. at 108-15.
105. Id. at 105.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘exploitation’ of the harder-working members of
society. For a good discussion of Van Parijs' argument, see Stuart White, Liberal Equality,
Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income, 45 POL. STUD. 312 (1997).
109. Van Parijs, supra note 50, at 108-12.
110. Id. at 112.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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perfectly willing to trade external resources with those who prefer work in
exchange for income.  Van Parijs then reasons, “There is a nonarbitrary and114
generally positive legitimate level of basic income that is determined by the per
capita value of society’s external resources and must be entirely financed by those
who appropriate these resources.”  This reasoning, according to Van Parijs,115
justifies a neutral, nondiscriminatory policy supporting basic income.  Van116
Parijs concludes by clarifying two points that his justification raises: “[W]hat
counts as external resources, and how is their value to be determined?”  This117
discussion need not detain us, and the reader can consult his argument in further
detail elsewhere.118
There is no doubt that a basic income would have a salient impact on the
amount of leisure that a significant number of the population would enjoy. But
how would it compare with the impact of working-time regulation? The first
thing to acknowledge about the basic income proposal is that even if the impact
would be significant (along some dimension), it would largely be confined to the
lowest-paid workers in the economy.  Because a basic income would provide119
at most a subsistence-level income to everyone,  only those individuals who120
earn subsistence-level incomes or lower would have either the option not to work
or the bargaining power to secure a more favorable work-leisure trade-off with
employers. All individuals above the subsistence level would see little change in
the possibility of enjoying more leisure.121
In contrast, working-time regulation would affect a substantially larger
proportion of the population. Not just subsistence-level workers, but large
sections of middle-class workers would also be affected by working-time
regulation that limited the number of work hours. This would be particularly true
if regulatory reform sought to increase salary thresholds and tighten the
exemptions currently applied to white-collar workers.  If one then had to choose122
between policies based on a liberty-enhancing effect on the ability of individuals
to pursue greater leisure, working-time regulation is preferred to basic income.
One might object that working-time regulation would be less flexible or
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 113.
118. Id. at 113-17.
119. Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 298-99 (1999)
(explaining the level of basic income would have to be fairly low to sustain an incentive to work
and provide the money required to fund it).
120. Id.
121. For example, in a setup with a 33.33% flat tax and a $6000 basic income, the ”break-even
point” would be on a yearly salary of $18,000—that is, everyone with a salary above $18,000
would be a net-contributor. Naturally, basic income is often framed as an instrument to counter
poverty. See generally KARL WIDERQUIST, INDEPENDENCE, PROPERTYLESSNESS, AND BASIC
INCOME: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AS THE POWER TO SAY NO (2013).
122. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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adaptable to individual needs than basic income. Regulation unfortunately often
comes in a one-size-fits-all form. If this is the case, working-time regulation
would impose upon some workers leisure time when they would in fact prefer to
work. In contrast, basic income places no restrictions on individuals’ ability to
pursue paid work.  Nor does basic income distort individual decisions on the123
margin through means testing or administratively-burdensome or stigmatizing
work requirements.  Is the greater coverage of working-time regulation worth124
the potential loss of individual choice? This must be a particularly important
concern if a policy that promotes leisure is based on the imperative of enhancing
individual liberty.
In fact, working-time regulation as it exists now—and even more as it is
envisioned in reform proposals—gives generous scope to individual preferences.
As previously mentioned, the current incarnation of the FLSA does not impose
maximum working hours.  Rather, it requires additional compensation for hours125
worked beyond the designated forty per week.  Thus, the FLSA does allow126
flexibility for employees’ different preferences over work and leisure to find
expression under the regulation. Although many reform proposals seek to abolish
overtime compensation, these proposals usually come with alternative means of
accommodating employees’ various work-leisure preferences. For instance, Schor
proposes replacing overtime compensation with “comp time”—the ability to earn
additional time off for overtime hours worked.  Workers could also trade-off127
compensation for other forms of time off—vacation, a shorter work year, or even
a shorter working career via sabbatical time. All of these possibilities allow for
the expression of differing worker preferences for leisure—and they would
establish more opportunities than exist under the current FLSA.
To avoid paternalism, we should permit workers latitude to divide their time
between work and leisure. Yet one should also recall the—very likely—socially
determined nature of work preferences.  Traditional economic theory posits that128
individual utility depends only on absolute consumption.  But recent theory and129
evidence acknowledges that individual utility also depends on relative
consumption—how much a person consumes depends on the consumption
choices of those around her.  For instance, consider the following example.130
123. See generally Van Parijs, supra note 50.
124. See id. at 105.
125. See supra Part II.B.
126. Handy Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept.
2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/hrg.htm [https://perma.cc/QQW7-RFUR].
127. Schor, supra note 71, at 167.
128. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of
Markets and other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75 (1998) (reviewing the economics
literature on the endogenous formation of preferences).
129. AMITAVA KRISHNA DUTT & BENJAMIN RADCLIFF, HAPPINESS, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS:
TOWARDS A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 147 (2009).
130. See generally Samuel Bowles & Yongjin Park, Emulation, Inequality, and Work Hours:
Was Thorstein Veblen Right?, 115 ECON. J. F397 (2005); Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities
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Suppose you can live in a 4000-square-foot house but everyone else lives in
6000-square-foot houses. But you can also choose to live in a 3000-square foot
house while everyone else lives in 2000-square-foot houses.  Facing this131
hypothetical scenario, most people choose to live in the smaller house, which
makes them better off in terms of relative consumption yet makes them worse off
in absolute terms.  Thus, others’ consumption decisions matter to one’s own.132
While giving a more accurate view of individual choice, relative-consumption
behavior can unfortunately be inefficient from an economic point of view, leading
to losses in social welfare.  Specifically, a desire to “keep up with the133
Joneses”  will cause people to spend more on consumption than they might134
otherwise. This is wasteful “arms race”  behavior because, since everyone does135
it, it does not change relative-consumption rankings. People would be better off
if everyone reduced consumption. Typically, because of the problem of
coordinating behavior and enforcing commitments, reducing consumption is
difficult or impossible without the intervention of government or some other
collective organization.136
Relative-consumption behavior also applies directly to the work versus
leisure choice.  From a desire to keep up with the consumption standards of137
others, individuals will allocate more time to work than leisure than they
otherwise would.  Although longer working hours generates more income and138
therefore more consumption, it lowers welfare because it is wasteful, “positional”
consumption. This inefficiency creates a scope for public policy. Absent the
relative-consumption effect, individuals would prefer to work fewer hours. Thus,
Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 137 (2005).
131. This hypothetical is drawn from Frank, supra note 130, at 137.
132. Id.
133. Id. (“The disparity [in relative consumption] gives rise to expenditure arms races focused
on positional goods—those for which relative position matters most. The result is to divert
resources from nonpositional goods, causing welfare losses.”).
134. Bowles & Park, supra note 130, at F398.
135. In addition to analogizing “relative consumption externalities” to an “arms race,” they
can also be described as “positional externalities.” See Robert H. Frank, Should Public Policy
Respond to Positional Externalities, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1777 (2008) (“Before addressing whether the
harm caused by positional externalities should be mitigated by legislation, it is useful to review the
conditions under which such externalities can be expected to cause harm in the first place. Those
conditions are precisely analogous to the ones that make military arms races between equally
matched rival nations wasteful.”). On the implications for positional externalities and the law
generally, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992). 
136. Relative consumption externalities can therefore be considered among the class of
“market failures” for which government intervention is justified in economic theory. See Frank,
supra note 130, at 140 (writing that the economics “profession has incorporated numerous other
forms of market failure into its arsenal of policy recommendations”).
137. For a study of relative consumption behavior in the case of the labor-leisure trade-off see
generally Bowles & Park, supra note 130.
138. Id. at F399-400.
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reducing working time can increase social welfare.  More importantly, although139
work-leisure preferences vary across individuals—requiring flexibility in the
regulation policy—the fact of relative-consumption effects justifies the reduction
of working time for all workers.  This addresses to a significant extent the one-140
size-does-not-fit-all objection.
The conclusion is that while basic income would certainly expand the scope
for leisure in society, this opportunity will only be available to some of the lowest
paid workers. Basic income will do nothing to increase availability of leisure time
for broad sections of middle- and even upper-class workers. On the other hand,
working-time regulation can do much more to make the choice of leisure time a
more tangible option for many of these workers. Working-time regulation can
therefore do better than basic income in expanding freedom—literally making
free time more abundant for more people.
B. Equality
Another lauded benefit of basic income is that it can have a salient effect on
the reduction of income inequality. Set at a high enough level, basic income could
end poverty at a stroke.  The tax financing of basic income can be made141
significantly progressive.  And because the transfer is lump sum, basic income142
can have a quite significant redistributive effect.  Thus, as basic-income143
advocates have pointed out, the fact that rich and poor alike receive basic income
does not mean that “a basic income would make both rich and poor richer than
before,”  nor that a basic income would increase income inequality. For144
example, if basic income were funded through a progressive income tax, “it is
clear the comparatively rich would need to pay both for their own basic income
and for much of the basic income of the comparatively poor.”  Financing basic145
income through such a mechanism can make it significantly redistributive.146
Significantly, however, basic income can be financed through alternative means
in ways that make its redistributive impact slight.  Finally, how redistributive147
a basic income is also depends on its level.148
139. Id. at F408-10 (discussing the policy implications of their research findings).
140. Id.
141. Matthews, supra note 2 (as indicated in the title of his article).
142. Richard Parncutt, Eliminate Poverty with Universal Basic Income and Flat Income Tax
(UBI-FIT) (2011), PARNCUTT.ORG, http://www.parncutt.org/BIFT1.html [https://perma.cc/M4WG-
W2GE].
143. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 9.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 6.
147. Id. (“Redistributive taxation, however, need not be the only source of funding. Alaska’s
dividend scheme . . . is funded out of part of the return on a diversified investment fund which the
state built up using the royalties on Alaska’s vast oil fields.”).
148. Id. at 10 (“The immediate impact on the income distribution can then be kept within
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But just how egalitarian is basic income? Does it achieve everything that an
egalitarian would desire? And how does the egalitarian impact of a basic income
compare to that of working-time regulation? In this section, this Article argues
that basic income has significant shortcomings in addressing egalitarian concerns.
These shortcomings include not only failing to deliver everything that an
egalitarian might want, but also undermining key egalitarian objectives. In
contrast, working-time regulation does much better at satisfying egalitarian
principles.
Note first that if the sole purpose of basic income were to reduce poverty or
maximin income, it would clearly fail. As already admitted, some conditional
income transfer program could probably achieve this objective much more
effectively.  Hence, the deeper case for basic income rests on an argument about149
maximinning, in Van Parijs’ version, “real freedom.”  Yet even this more150
sophisticated argument is subject to criticism. As described in the previous
section, this particular philosophical defense of basic income has its roots in John
Rawls’ political philosophy and in particular with his principles of equality.151
Elizabeth Anderson refers to this conception of equality as “luck egalitarianism”
or “equality of fortune.”  She contends that this conception of equality fails a152
basic test that any egalitarian philosophy should meet: “that its principles express
equal respect and concern for all citizens.”153
Anderson argues that luck egalitarianism fails this test in three ways.  The154
first two directly implicate our evaluation of basic income.  The first objection155
is that luck egalitarianism deprives some citizens of enjoying what she calls “the
social conditions of freedom” on the grounds—incorrect, she argues—that they
are at fault for losing them.  According to luck egalitarianism, the “fundamental156
aim of equality is to compensate people for undeserved bad luck—being born
with poor native endowments, bad parents, and disagreeable personalities,
suffering from accidents and illness, and so forth.”  But following this principle157
to its logical conclusion can lead to some disturbing results. Anderson’s strongest
example is dependent caretakers.  These include individuals, most often women,158
who choose to care for others (children, the aged, or the ill or infirm) but who
fairly narrow bounds for a modest basic income. But the higher its level, the higher the average rate
of income tax and therefore the greater the redistribution from the comparatively rich to the
comparatively poor.”).
149. See supra Part III.A.
150. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 24.
151. Anderson, supra note 119, at 290.
152. Id. at 289.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 288.
158. Id. at 297 (“Dependent caretakers and their children face special problems under equality
of fortune.”).
2017] BETTER THAN BASIC INCOME? 493
thereby render themselves dependent on others, such as a (male) wage earner or
on welfare payments.  According to luck egalitarianism, even if these dependent159
caretakers live in destitution, they are not entitled to public assistance because
they have voluntarily chosen these roles.160
In Anderson’s view, this result evidences a failure to express equal concern
for all of society’s members.  In fact, she uses Van Parijs’ case for basic income161
as an illustration of this failure.  Because basic income is awarded to all162
unconditionally, “[l]azy, able-bodied surfers would be just as entitled to that
income as dependent caretakers or the disabled.”  In order to not destroy work163
incentives and thereby the (potential) tax base for a basic income, the level of
basic income would have to be kept (possibly extremely) low.  Such a low basic164
income might satisfy surfers who must support only themselves and may be
content with extremely modest living arrangements.  But it may be inadequate165
for dependent caretakers who must take care not only of themselves but also
others, or the disabled who have special expenses.  As Anderson concludes,166
“Van Parijs’s proposal effectively indulges the tastes of the lazy and irresponsible
at the expense of others who need assistance.”  Thus, basic income does not167
evince an equal respect or concern for members of society.
A second objection that Anderson makes is that luck egalitarianism grounds
the basis for citizens’ claims on the public in the observation that some
individuals are inherently inferior to others in terms of their attributes, talents, and
other characteristics.  “Thus, its principles express contemptuous pity for those168
the state stamps as sadly inferior and uphold envy as a basis for distributing goods
from the lucky to the unfortunate.”  Anderson does not illustrate this criticism169
with basic income, but it is simple to draw that connection. Van Parijs’
paradigmatic beneficiary of basic income is the “lazy surfer.”  And basic170
income would no doubt constitute a substantial enhancement in “real freedom”
for such individuals, and would make possible a fulfilling and meaningful life
that would not be possible in the absence of basic income. Another example is
persons who desire little more than to create art, but that cannot support
themselves as artists because their work remains unknown or unpopular. For
these persons, basic income would also make possible lives of meaning
previously available only to others.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 298.
162. Id. at 299.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 289.
169. Id.
170. Van Parijs, supra note 50, at 101-02, 130-31.
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But if the lazy surfer is the paradigmatic beneficiary of basic income, is it the
representative one? Many—if not most—recipients of basic income are unlikely
to be lazy surfers or starving artists. Instead, unlike these convention-crashing
iconoclasts, most recipients of basic income would prefer to become “productive”
and “contributing” members of society. What would basic income mean to them?
Unfortunately, for these individuals, basic income may well have the effect of
increasing, rather than decreasing, inequality.
Consider Anderson’s humorously hypothetical, but illustrative, example of
the communicative effects of public compensation:
To the stupid and untalented: Unfortunately, other people don’t value
what little you have to offer in the system of production. Your talents are
too meager to command much market value. Because of the misfortune
that you were born so poorly endowed with talents, we productive ones
will make it up to you: we’ll let you share in the bounty of what we have
produced with our vastly superior and highly valued abilities.171
For many proponents, basic income is supposed to avoid these more-or-less
explicit or implicit judgments because of its universality.  This particular feature172
of basic income will be discussed in more detail below.  But it is hard to173
imagine basic income not having the judgmental effects Anderson describes.
Although all citizens receive basic income, there would be little doubt about who
would be the net beneficiaries and the net contributors of the scheme. Thus, on
the principles underlying basic income, “People lay claim to the resources of
egalitarian redistribution in virtue of their inferiority to others, not in virtue of
their equality to others.”  By simply giving cash to the poor, basic income in174
effect tells net beneficiaries that they have nothing to offer society. Basic income
is thus a kind of bread and circuses for the twenty-first century.
Rather than basic income, net beneficiaries may well prefer the kinds of
public goods and specific assistance traditionally associated with the welfare-
state. Most specifically in this case, these goods would include those such as
education, vocational training, unemployment insurance, and so forth.  Such175
goods make possible the integration of individuals into the normal and expected
practices of society. Unlike basic income, the justification for these goods is
grounded in equality: They recognize the possible contributions of all members
of society and equip or sustain them to be equal (in some measure) participants.
Eduardo Porter nicely summarizes this sentiment: 
[R]eplacing everything in the safety net with a check would limit the
scope of government assistance in damaging ways. Say we know the
choice of neighborhood makes a difference to the development of poor
171. Anderson, supra note 119, at 305.
172. See generally id.
173. See infra Part III.E.
174. Anderson, supra note 119, at 306.
175. Id. at 313.
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children. Housing vouchers might lead them to move into a better one.
A monthly check would probably not.176
In contrast to basic income, the effects of working-hours regulation are
substantially more egalitarian. First, working-hours regulation integrates work
and leisure by providing more opportunities for free time to those in paid
employment. This is in contrast to basic income, which is premised on and
engenders the potential division of the population into working and nonworking.
Working-time regulation makes leisure more widely available, rather than
confining it to those who work at a subsistence level. Thus, all get to enjoy
leisure. The rich already have leisure—or work in professions that are
intrinsically rewarding. And working-time regulation increases the leisure-time
opportunities for both the poor and middle class. Further, as will be discussed
subsequently, working-hours regulation can increase employment opportunities
and makes work more widely abundant as well. In sharp contrast to basic income,
therefore, working time regulation ameliorates rather than exacerbates the basic
social division between working and nonworking populations.
Working-time regulation has at least two other egalitarian effects worth
mentioning. The first is that it can reduce gender inequalities. Although women
have made significant advancement by entering into more careers and
professions, they lag behind men in pay.  As has also been documented, women177
still tend to do more of the housework at home than do men.  These two facts178
are related. Sharing more of the household burden limits women’s participation
in the market economy. These limits make it more difficult for women to advance
in their careers or undertake more demanding professions. Indeed, countries with
shorter workweeks rank highly in terms of gender equality.  In particular,179
government-funded paid paternity leave—which certainly can be included as kind
of working-time regulation—can make a salient difference. In countries with
these policies, men that take advantage of them do more domestic work than
otherwise.180
It seems likely that if more free time allows men to share more of the
household work, then working-time regulation will reduce gender inequality.181
To be clear, the gender equality effects are uncertain. For instance, Juliet Schor
recognizes that although her proposals “are gender-neutral,” “[w]ithout change
176. Porter, supra note 10.
177. According to the OECD 2014 Database, the average ‘gender wage gap’ in OECD
countries was 15.46%, and 17.91% in the United States. Gender Wage Gap, ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/genderwagegap.
htm [https://perma.cc/MEB8-46TM] (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
178. For comprehensive studies of the relation between gender-based wage and work
inequality, see FRANCINE D. BLAU, ET AL., GENDER, INEQUALITY, AND WAGES (2013) and LYNN
PRINCE COOKIE, GENDER-CLASS EQUALITY IN POLITICAL ECONOMIES (2011).
179. Id. 
180. Id.
181. COOKIE, supra note 178, at 212-13.
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in underlying gender roles . . . women will be more likely to take advantage of
them.”  The effect will be only to reproduce existing gender inequalities. But182
"[i]f men take considerably more responsibility for children and housework—as
many now say they want to—then they too will want to opt for working patterns
that are compatible with family duties.”  This ambiguity is one reason the183
reform of working-time regulation should take the form, in at least some amount,
of parental leave including some mandatory portion for fathers. Thus the form of
policy can itself encourage a shift in gender roles.
There is also an association between income inequality and the length of
working hours. The previous section discussed the problem of relative-
consumption effects: Conspicuous consumption—keeping up with the
Joneses—causes people to spend more time working than enjoying leisure.  In184
fact, this effect is stronger when income inequality is higher—when the Joneses
become even richer than the rest of us. As the economists Samuel Bowles and
Yongjin Park have shown, “Data on work hours in ten countries over the period
1963-98 show that greater inequality is indeed associated [with] longer work
hours.”  As also discussed previously, work-time regulation can be a way to185
counter this welfare-reducing effect of inequality.
There is a concern that many poor workers would be unable to take advantage
of working-time regulation. “The poorest third would work just as many hours
as ever—or more, as more work became available . . . .”  Those who gain free186
time would be mostly middle class. This is why it is essential, as mentioned
previously, that further reductions in working time come with little or no loss in
pay.  There are several methods to achieve this.  Perhaps the most187 188
straightforward is an increase in the minimum wage. As Schor explains, “While
only a limited fraction of workers receive the minimum, when it rises, it creates
upward pressure on those wages which are somewhat higher.”  It is no accident189
that the FLSA includes both wage and hour regulations.  Such measures ensure190
that workers in the lower scales of the income distribution enjoy all of the
benefits of productivity growth—both in wages and in free time.
Furthermore, working-time regulation by itself can have egalitarian effects.
If working-time regulation creates more middle-class jobs—more on this in the
182. SCHOR, supra note 89, at 151.
183. Id.
184. Id. 
185. Bowles & Park, supra note 130, at 397.
186. SCHOR, supra note 89, at 150.
187. See supra Part II.C.
188. Perhaps the most effective way to maintain or increase wages at the bottom of the income
distribution is greater coverage in collective bargaining. However, because unions have found it
difficult to increase their bargaining influence beyond their immediate membership—currently
around six percent of the private workforce—this route presents a challenge. Minimum wage
legislation, discussed shortly, has more immediate promise.
189. SCHOR, supra note 89, at 151.
190. Miller, supra note 64, at 3.
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next section—it will create opportunities for lower-paid workers to move up in
the income distribution.  This effect will reduce inequality. But a lower supply191
of low-wage labor will also create pressure for employers to raise wages to fill
job vacancies.  And this second effect will also reduce income inequality. Third,192
both rising wages and an increased number of jobs will reduce unemployment
and increase labor-force participation. Because unemployment and under-
employment are important drivers of inequality, this third set of effects will
reduce income inequality.  Most critically, because these effects increase193
participation of the lowest earners in paid work, the consequences are much more
egalitarian—in the deeper, social and cultural sense just discussed—than is the
case with basic income.
To summarize, whatever egalitarian effects of basic income on economic
inequality, it may well be miniscule in terms of a broader sense of social and
political inequality. In contrast, working-time regulation will not only have
salient, mitigating effects on economic and gender inequalities, but it fosters
broader participation in the economy and society that reduce these same, deeper
social inequalities.
C. Technological Unemployment
Many proponents of basic income favor it because it addresses a possible
impending social dilemma: the creation of mass unemployment because of
changes in technology. In this view, technology is creating (or will create)
massive disruption in the work place, potentially abolishing the need for
employed work.  But this change presents an enormous social problem: what to194
do with all of the unemployed people? The answer, according to some, is basic
income, which provides a guaranteed means of existence independent of paid
191. Economic studies of the effects of working-hours regulation on unemployment rates are
ambiguous. See, e.g., Arie Kapteyn et al., The Myth of Worksharing, 11 LAB. ECON. 293, 293
(2004) (reviewing the “most pertinent theoretical and recent empirical contributions to the
literature” and finding that “a positive direct effect on employment of a reduction of working
hours” but that “taking into account indirect effects, in particular the upward effects on wages,
[they] find that the long-run effect becomes small and insignificant”); Jennifer Hunt, Has Work-
Sharing Worked in Germany?, 114 Q. J. ECON. 117 (1999) (finding for Germany that in response
to a one hour fall in standard hours, employment rose by 0.3-0.7 percent). 
192. Most studies do find a positive wage effect from working-hours regulation. See, e.g.,
Hunt, supra note 191; Pedro S. Raposo & Jan C. van Ours, How Working Time Reduction Affects
Jobs and Wages, 106 ECON. LETTERS 61 (2010).
193. As sociologists and economists frequently observe, unemployment and lower labor force
participation are themselves important determinants of income inequality. See, e.g., LANE
KENWORTHY, EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM: JOBS, INCOME, AND GROWTH IN AFFLUENT COUNTRIES
(2004).
194. ERIK BRYNJILFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE 6-7 (2012); P.
CAHUC ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS 627-76 (2014).
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employment.  It is perhaps not surprising that the most vocal advocates of this195
particular argument in favor of basic income are associated with Silicon Valley.196
In response to this argument, it is first worth pointing out that the prospect of
technological unemployment may be a nonproblem. How much technology is
changing productivity and employment is a matter of considerable debate. Indeed,
according to some prominent economists, the rate of productivity growth has
slowed down, almost to a standstill.  If this is true, technological change is197
unlikely to produce massive unemployment. Low productivity growth creates
social challenges of its own, including the ability to reduce income inequality.
Basic income may still have some useful policy purpose in this case, but
addressing mass unemployment is not one of them. In this section, this Article
focuses on that particular problem.
Let’s assume for the sake of discussion that massive, technology-induced
unemployment is a serious problem. Basic income, under a kind of luck-
egalitarian rationale, would seem to be the perfect solution.  Technology has198
rendered large numbers of people unemployable, for reasons that are completely
beyond their control. Basic income would give such individuals a means of
sustaining themselves, and this is justified in view of the fact that they are
“victims” of brute luck.
But is basic income really the perfect solution to mass unemployment?
Consider again working-hours regulation. One early rationale for hours
regulation—and a continuing one, especially in light of the mass-unemployment
argument—is that it can reduce unemployment.  By reducing the number of199
hours any individual employee can work, employers will find it necessary to hire
additional employees to meet the shortfall in production.  Thus, hours regulation200
195. MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS
FUTURE 178-80 (2015).
196. Annie Lowrey, The Anti-Poverty Experiment That Could Fix America’s Broken Welfare
System, N.Y. MAG. (May 1, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/04/first-universal-
basic-income-experiment.html [https://perma.cc/9E72-VLJ5] (discussing Silicon Valley’s “love
affair” with the idea of basic income); Sara Ashley O’Brien, Why Some Oakland Residents Won’t
Have To Worry About Rent, CNN MONEY (May 31, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/31/
technology/y-combinator-basic-income-oakland-pilot/index.html [https://perma.cc/6M3X-DTZY]
(discussing Y Combinator's—a Silicon Valley company that provides seed funding to startups,
efforts to establish a basic income pilot in Oakland, California).
197. See generally ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S.
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (2016).
198. Lowrey, supra note 196 (“Silicon Valley is in the midst of a love affair with [basic
income], arguing that when robots come to take all of our jobs, we’re going to need stronger
redistributive policies to help keep families afloat.”); see also Manjoo, supra note 10.
199. See Malamud, supra note 71, at 2223.
200. See Kapteyn et al., supra note 191, at 293-94 (explaining that a positive employment
effect comes from the “simple notion that in a given period a fixed amount of labour input required
to produce a fixed volume of goods and services can be shared between persons who are already
employed and those who are unemployed”).
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also provides an answer to technological employment.  In fact, the extent of the201
effect of technological change can be used to determine how much of an effect
regulation should have on the maximum number of hours. If technological change
has dramatic effects on unemployment, the maximum number of hours should be
made lower. Again, technological unemployment may be a non-problem. If it is
not, the egalitarian effects of hours regulation on the mix of jobs (as discussed in
the previous section) presents a continuing rationale.  But even if it is, working-202
hours regulation can also address the unemployment problem to which basic
income presents itself as an answer.
D. Transforming Work
Transforming the workplace—making it more humane, equitable, and
democratic—has long been an egalitarian aspiration of the left.  For a tradition203
201. Evidence for the pro-employment effects of working-hours regulation has been mixed.
But more recent studies are more sanguine. The reduction in working hours from thirty-nine to
thirty-five hours in France in 2000 provides a much-studied test case. Some studies, using matching
models or macro data, find large positive effects on employment. See Bruno Crépon et al., RTT,
Productivité et Emploi: Nouvelles Estimations sur Données d’Enterprises, 376 ÉCONOMIE ET
STATISTIQUE 55 (2004); Matthieu Bunel, Aides Incitatives et Déterminants des Embauches des
établissements Passés à 35 Heures, 376 ÉCONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE 91 (2004); Alain Gubian et al.,
Les Effets de la RTT sur L’emploi: Des Simulations Ex Ante Aux Évaluations Ex Post, 376
ÉCONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE 25 (2004). On the other hand, studies using microeconomic data find
no effect on employment. See Matthieu Chemin & Etienne Wasmer, Using Alsace-Moselle Local
Laws to Build a Difference-in-Differences Estimation Strategy of the Employment Effects of the 35-
Hour Workweek Regulation in France, 27 J. LABOR ECON. 487 (2009); Marcello Estevão & Filipa
Sá, The 35-Hour Workweek in France: Straightjacket or Welfare Improvement?, 55 ECON. POL’Y
418 (2008). A recent study, explaining shortcomings of each of these studies and developing a
novel identification strategy, finds that France’s work-reduction legislation “reduced France’s
annual unemployment rate by 1.58% and raised the real GDP by 1.36% from 2000 to 2007.”
Zaichao Du et al., The Macroeconomic Effects of the 35-h Workweek Regulation in France, 13 B.E.
J. OF MACROECONOMICS 881, 881 (2012).
202. See supra Part III.B. Note also that other empirical studies find that working-hours
regulation has other positive impacts on workers’ welfare, such as increases in leisure time and
wages, independent of the effect of working-hours regulation on employment. See, e.g., Anders
Hayden, France’s 35-Hour Week: Attack on Business? Win-Win Reform? Or Betrayal of
Disadvantaged Workers?, 34 POL. & SOC’Y 503, 503 (2006) (finding that “[m]ost . . . employees
cite quality-of-life improvements”); Hunt, supra note 191, at 117 (finding “the hourly wage rose
enough to offset the decline in actual hours worked”); Raposo & van Ours, supra note 192, at 61
(finding “increased hourly wages”); Oskar Nordström Skans, The Impact of Working-Time
Reductions on Actual Hours and Wages: Evidence from Swedish Register-Data, 11 LAB. ECON.
647, 647 (2004) (finding “hourly wages rose sharply”).
203. See generally G. A. COHEN, IF YOU’RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOW COME YOU’RE SO RICH?
(2000).
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of the Marxist, socialist, or anarchist left, this aspiration is fundamental.204
According to these perspectives, not only is it important to reduce economic
inequality, but it is also crucial to remove the exploitation and domination that
accompanies the exchange of labor in a capitalist market economy.205
Exploitation constitutes a kind of unfairness: Some individuals (capitalists) profit
from the labor of others (workers).  Likewise, domination is both unequal and206
illiberal: Individuals do not have full control over how they dispose of their labor
or working time.  Accordingly, leftists within this tradition thought mere income207
redistribution insufficiently inegalitarian.  What was also required was some208
form of public or democratic ownership of the “principal means of production.”209
Only under such conditions would society be able to end exploitation and
domination, as well as economic inequality.210
Perhaps for this reason, left-leaning scholars were initially skeptical of
proposals for basic income. Writing in response to Robert van der Veen and
Philippe Van Parijs,  Erik Olin Wright contended that “some form of social211
ownership of the principal means of production is essential for the development
and reproduction” of the kind of society for which they believed basic income
would be sufficient.  Basic income would be neither economically nor212
politically feasible without extensive capital controls and therefore substantial
steps toward socialist property institutions.213
Nevertheless, and rather avowedly, basic-income proposals make no effort
to transform the workplace—at least not directly. In contrast to the socialist left,
204. Id.
205. Erik Olin Wright explains the injustice of exploitation and domination (what he terms,
alienation) in this way: 
In the Marxist tradition, two of the central indictments of capitalism stem from this class
relation: first, workers are exploited because they must work harder and longer for
capitalists than is needed simply to provide for their own standard of living; and second,
they are alienated because they enter into employment relations within which they are
deprived of power over both their laboring activities and the fruits of that activity.
Erik Olin Wright, Basic Income, Stakeholder Grants, and Class Analysis, in REDESIGNING
REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 29, at 92.
206. Id. 
207. Id.
208. Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer, Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation, 6 J.
ECON. PERSP. 101, 104-05 (1992) (arguing some form of public ownership is necessary because
large-scale income redistribution rests on special and unsustainable conditions).
209. Erik Olin Wright, Why Something like Socialism Is Necessary for the Transition to
Something like Communism, 15 THEORY & SOC. 657, 664 (1986).
210. Id.
211. See generally Robert van der Veen & Philippe Van Parijs, A Capitalist Road to
Communism, 15 THEORY & SOC. 635 (1986).
212. Wright, supra note 209, at 658.
213. Id. at 666.
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basic income could constitute a “capitalist road to communism.”  By providing214
nothing more than a cash transfer, basic income at most changes only background
conditions of the labor market. Otherwise, labor markets are left untouched and
basic income works solely through public institutions.
This feature of basic income is also quite consonant with other features of
Rawlsian political philosophy from which luck egalitarianism takes its source.215
Several features of Rawlsian philosophy indicate that public policy should be
enacted through and apply only to public institutions.  For instance, Rawls216
wrote,
[O]nce a suitable minimum is provided by transfers, it may be perfectly
fair that the rest of total income be settled by the price system . . . .
Moreover, this way of dealing with the claims of need would appear to
be more effective than trying to regulate income by minimum wage
standards, and the like. It is better to assign to each branch only such
tasks as are compatible with one another. Since the market is not suited
to answer the claims of need, these should be met by a separate
arrangement.217
Rawls also says that the Difference Principle applies only to the basic
structure of society.  Although Rawls is not always precise about his meaning218
of the basic structure, one “widespread interpretation”  is as follows: The basic219
structure of a society is defined by “the provisions of its constitution, in such
specific legislation as may be required to implement those provisions, and in
further legislation and policy which are of central importance but which resist
formulation in the constitution itself.”  On this view of justice, the scheme just220
laid out—public policy enacted solely through public institutions, while leaving
private economic action unencumbered—therefore becomes quite appropriate.
Indeed, restricting the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure
yields directly such a “division of labor” in society. In a market society,
individuals maximize their self-interest through exchange, while a Rawlsian state
selects a maximinning tax function that maximizes the amount of primary goods
(or whatever is to be maximinned) going to the least well off.221
Moreover, there is a sharper conclusion one can draw from this view of the
proper allocation of public policy. In this argument, basic income is superior to
214. See, e.g., van der Veen & Van Parijs, supra note 211. 
215. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 25.
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 277.
218. Id. at 263.
219. COHEN, supra note 203, at 136.
220. Id. at 137.
221. Id. at 127 (writing, “The standard . . . Rawlsian application of the difference principle
[restricted to the basic structure] can be modeled as follows. There is a market economy in which
all agents seek to maximize their own gains, and there is a Rawlsian state that selects a tax function
on income that maximizes the income return to the worst off people . . . . ”).
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working-hours regulation precisely because it respects this division between
private market exchange and public redistribution. That is, public policy should
not invade the market because this site should be left to individuals to bargain and
contract on their own. In the case of basic income and working-hours regulation,
this view implies the kind of evaluation that we encountered—and
rejected—earlier. This evaluation is that basic income is more conducive to
individual freedom than working-hours regulation. Basic income respects the
right of each individual to decide—to contract—for herself about how much and
even whether she should work. Basic income corrects for the inequalities created
in the market while also respecting this freedom to contract. Working-hours
regulation, on the other hand, seeks to remedy these inequalities directly, but at
the cost of individual choice. Other arguments can be made in favor of a
relatively strict separation between market freedom and government
redistribution, including efficiency arguments. I responded to the basic argument
earlier and responses to other arguments can be found elsewhere.
However, the recognition that basic income would have significant, if
indirect, impacts on the employment relationship has made friends out of former
critics of basic income. Erik Olin Wright, one of these former critics, wrote that
“[a] generous, unconditional basic income which would allow employees a
meaningful exit option from the employment relation directly transforms the
character of power within the class relations of capitalist society.”  For one,222
basic income would allow people to engage in “non-commodified forms of
socially productive activity,” such as care-giving labor, art, politics, and
community service.  In addition, basic income would give individuals a more223
“realistic” exit option from the labor market, which would increase their
bargaining power with respect to employers.  It is worth emphasizing again that224
such bargaining power could be used to change any term in the employment
contract upon which the employer and employee agree (and that is legally
permissible).  And indeed, certainly one term open for negotiation is the number225
of working hours and the extent of leisure time. Finally, Wright also argues that
basic income could have other salient effects on workers’ power within the
employment relationship, such as the contribution to an increase in union
density.  Thus, basic income can substantially alter the balance of class power226
in a society and therefore indirectly change the terms of the employment
relationship.
Yet if it is desirable to transform the employment relationship, why not
222. Wright, supra note 205, at 91-100.
223. Id. at 95.
224. Id. at 95-96.
225. Recall the discussion in Part III.A.
226. The argument for higher union density is as follows: Employers may prefer to bargain
with unions only in tight labor markets. In tight labor markets, there is pressure to increase wages
and a labor union—especially a centralized one—can contain this wage pressure within reasonable
bounds. By contributing to a tighter labor market, basic income could then encourage employers
to be more accepting of labor unions.
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simply do it directly, such as through working-time regulation? Moreover, if this
is to be done, can it be normatively justified? Or does Rawls’ restriction of the
scope of the Difference Principle to society’s basic structure disqualify such an
attempt? Before directly comparing basic income and working-time regulation,
I will first discuss the normative legitimacy of workplace regulation.
Although Rawls says that his principles of justice apply only to the basic
structure of society, it is “seriously unclear which institutions are supposed to
qualify as part of the basic structure.”  For example, one can find no argument227
why the basic structure would not include the public, legally enforceable rules
that govern private organizations, such as the family or business firms. In
Cohen’s interpretation, the basic structure is the “broad coercive outline” of
society that would include all legal rules governing such organizations.  If228
working-hours legislation, by itself or in conjunction with other legal rules, were
necessary to maximin the primary goods or real freedom of the least well off,
there does not appear to be any Rawlsian principle that would exclude such an
option.
Rawls also says that “the market is not suited to answer the claims of
need.”  One interpretation of the words “not suited” is that it is more efficient229
to redistribute (or maximin) through government transfers rather than through
market institutions. Although without referencing Rawls, such an argument is
made by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.  They argue that because230
redistribution through legal rules is just as distortionary as the tax system, it
would be better to choose only efficient legal rules and redistribute only through
taxes and transfers.  As I have extensively argued elsewhere, this assumes that231
redistributive legal rules are always inefficient.  But this is not the case, and it232
is easy to generate examples where legal rules that reduce income inequality are
also more efficient than the status quo rule.  Below, this Article argues that233
working-hours regulation is an example of such a legal rule—it can both reduce
inequality and inefficiency.  Thus, from an efficiency point of view, there is no234
necessary reason why we shouldn’t apply egalitarian principles to the
workplace.235
If we accept that direct regulation of the workplace is legitimate, we must still
227. COHEN, supra note 203, at 136.
228. Id. at 137 (distinguishing the “noncoercive structure of the family” from the “law of the
land” that also governs and structures the family).
229. RAWLS, supra note 25, at 277.
230. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 26.
231. Id. at 668.
232. See Dimick, supra note 24. 
233. Id. One example is antitrust legislation. By increasing competition, antitrust law both
increases efficiency and lowers prices, which raises the real income of (relatively) poor consumers
and lowers the profits of (relatively) rich producers. Thus antitrust law can be both redistributive
and efficient.
234. See LEE ET AL., supra note 72.
235. Anderson, supra note 119, at 289.
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ask whether working-time regulation or basic income is more effective at
transforming the workplace. If the goal is only to generate more leisure time, then
working-time reduction would be superior, simply because of its directness and
its applicability to a far larger share of the population.  If the broader goal is to236
transform the workplace, then basic income could possibly do more than
working-hours regulation alone because the greater bargaining power supported
by a basic income could be used to enhance any feature of the workplace in favor
of the employee.  But if the goal were to transform the workplace, working237
hours regulation could simply be a part of a larger set of legal rules (or a regime
of collective bargaining) that could most certainly transform the workplace more
extensively than basic income alone.
E. Universality
Another feature of basic income that is frequently cited in its favor is its
universality.  Under a basic income proposal, every person would receive a238
transfer, whether rich or poor.  Because it is universal, it has been assumed that239
basic income would not have the stigma associated with traditional, means-tested
welfare programs.  The absence of stigma would have several salient240
consequences. First, the lack of stigma alone can be thought to benefit the poor
insofar as they do not have to bear the social opprobrium associated with poverty
programs.  Second, the take-up rate for basic income would be higher than for241
means-tested programs (and a higher take-up reduces the rate of poverty).242
Third, because of its universality, basic income is claimed to be more politically
sustainable. For instance, Eduardo Porter writes that basic income “would be
politically secure. Programs for the poor are often maligned as poor programs.
Indeed, defunding antipoverty programs rarely carries political consequences
because the poor rarely vote. It’s another story entirely when everyone
benefits.”243
There is some limited evidence that universal benefits receive greater public
support,  although the case is neither strong nor clear-cut.  However, even244 245
236. LEE ET AL., supra note 72.
237. Van Parijs, supra note 50, at 105.
238. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 9 (writing “the most striking feature of a basic income is no
doubt that it is paid, indeed paid at the same level, to rich and poor alike, irrespective of their
income level”).
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 10.
241. Id. at 9-10 (discussing both of these arguments: because “there is nothing humiliating
about benefits given to all as a matter of citizenship . . . this may count as an advantage in itself .
. . [and has a positive] effect . . . on the rate of take-up”).
242. Id.
243. Porter, supra note 10.
244. Id.
245. There is macro-level evidence that in counties with welfare benefits that are more
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supposing that universal benefits receive more political support than means-tested
benefits, can this feature be assumed to hold in the case of basic income? My
argument in this section is, “No.” There are two reasons for this conclusion. The
first reason is that basic income is intrinsically different from other universal
benefits.  Other types of benefits are provided as specific kinds of goods—not246
always but frequently insurance kinds of goods.  In contrast, basic income is247
simply a cash transfer.  This distinction makes a difference for at least two248
reasons. In the first instance, such goods are of more value to the rich than is
simple cash. Well-funded public schooling—either primary, secondary, or
tertiary—may be the best example of a publicly provided, universal good that is
supported by rich and poor alike. Education is valued by the rich—if the state
provides high-quality schooling then it will find widespread support. The same
goes for other universal public goods—pensions, healthcare, and even
unemployment insurance. The same cannot be said for a tax-funded basic income.
Why do the rich need cash? Why not simply reduce the taxes that the rich pay?
The difference between a public good and a transfer also matters because it
is a way of disguising redistribution. When taxes are used to fund public goods
available to all, each citizen has access to the good on equal terms. But what
appears as access to goods on open and equal terms actually conceals a vast
amount of redistribution.  With a progressive tax system, the rich not only pay249
for the education of their children, but subsidize the education of the poor as well.
Similarly, although benefits such as social security are dependent on one’s
income and work history, the dispersion in transfers is typically smaller than the
inequality in market (that is, pre-tax, pre-transfer) incomes.  In contrast, with250
universal, poverty is lower and redistribution is higher. See generally Walter Korpi & Joakim
Palme, The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions,
Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Counties, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 661 (1998). However, micro-
level studies are much less conclusive. See Mads Meier Jaeger, United But Divided: Welfare
Regimes and the Level and Variance in Public Support for Redistribution, 25 EUROPEAN SOC. REV.
723, 723 (2009) (concluding from a review of a large literature that previous research “find[s] little
evidence that welfare regimes [defined by features such as universalism] shape public support in
any systematic way”); Christian Albrekt Larsen, The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How
Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 145, 147 (2008) (labeling as a
“dead end” the inconclusive attempts to link institutional features of welfare regimes, such as
universalism, with micro-level attitudes about support for the welfare state).
246. See generally Pateman, supra note 46.
247. Korpi & Palme, supra note 245, at 662 (referring to welfare benefits frequently as “social
insurance”).
248. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 3. 
249. Korpi & Palme, supra note 245, at 661 (observing the “[o]utcomes of market-based
distribution are often more unequal than those of earnings-related social insurance programs,” that
is, even when benefit levels depend on market income, benefits are distributed more equally than
are market incomes).
250. Whether disguising the extent of redistribution is a normatively acceptable thing to do
is an interesting question, but not one addressed in this Article.
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cash transfers (as in basic income), the redistributive effects are obvious. With
only knowledge of the tax schedule and the amount of the grant, one can easily
determine who gains and who losses under basic income. Because it is simply a
cash transfer, basic income quite transparently separates recipients into net
beneficiaries and net payers —a feature that is not so obvious when considering251
public goods.
The second reason that broad public support will not transfer to universal
basic income is that most other universal schemes have a close association with
individuals' work contributions.  A strong social norm exists—legitimate or252
not—that individuals’ contribute toward their own income.  Social security253
benefits, as just mentioned, depend on work history and prior income—as do
unemployment benefits.  The provision of education recognizes that individuals254
cannot contribute unless they have the basic skills and knowledge to do so. Even
health care can be viewed as a precondition of work—individuals cannot
contribute unless they are healthy.  Even the exception proves the rule.255
Disability benefits are distributed only on the condition that individuals cannot
work.
Thus, we should expect an income transfer that emphatically disregards an
obligation to work to be met with heavy skepticism. Indeed, despite the frequent
recognition that basic income’s universalism should lead to broad public
support,  other journalistic commentators intuitively recognize the problem of256
this assumption. For instance, Ezra Klein writes:
251. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 11. 
252. Feminist scholars have frequently observed the close association with paid labor and state
provision of welfare benefits. See generally Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of
Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, 58 AM. SOC. REV.
303 (1993). A critique of the welfare state follows from this observation, but responding to it is
beyond the scope of this Article.
253. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Reciprocity, Self-Interest, and the Welfare State, 26
NORDIC J. POL. ECON. 33, 33 (2000) (arguing “voters support the welfare state because it conforms
to deeply held norms of reciprocity and conditional obligations to others”).
254. Ezra Klein, A Universal Basic Income Only Makes Sense If Americans Change How They
Think About Work, VOX (June 1, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/6/1/11827024/universal-basic-
income [ https://perma.cc/4CWH-Y2CP].
255. The connection between work and health insurance can certainly be questioned. Perhaps
this is why universal health insurance has been so difficult to achieve in the United States where
the norm of deservingness is perhaps strongest. 
256. Porter, supra note 10 (“Being universal—that is, for the homeless and the masters of the
universe alike—the program would be free of the cumbersome assessments required to determine
eligibility. It would also escape the stigma typically attached to programs for the poor.”); James
Surowiecki, The Case for Free Money, NEW YORKER (June 20, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2016/06/20/why-don’t-we-have-universal-basic-income [ttps://perma.cc/XE7M-FZ8W]
(“But the appeal of a basic income—a kind of Social Security for everyone—is easy to understand
. . . . [I]f it’s truly universal, it could help destigmatize government assistance.”).
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But the case against a UBI [universal basic income] flows from the
premise that this much cultural change around work is effectively
impossible. In that world, a UBI would become a form of welfare, and
its recipients would be pitied and derided. An angry public would resent
handing over cash to the undeserving poor and would forever be
agitating to cut or eliminate the checks.257
Thus, basic income is unlikely to evade that stigma that is avoided with other
types of universal transfers. Indeed, one can see this problem as simply an
application of Anderson’s critique of luck egalitarianism.  By separating people258
into income beneficiaries and payers, basic income essentially communicates the
message that certain individuals are deemed inadequate and unable to contribute
to society or provide for themselves.  As discussed above, although some259
individuals may have no qualm accepting such a judgment, others—those who
do desire to contribute—will feel quite different.  Thus, basic income’s260
universalism does not save it from making demeaning judgments about
individuals’ abilities. And not only are these judgments harmful to the poor
recipients of basic income. Because of what it communicates, this judgment will
also reduce public support for the policy.  261
In the aspects discussed here, working-time regulation would much more easily
fulfill the requirements of a universal benefit. First, as already discussed, the
consequences of working-time regulation—more leisure—would be available to
a much broader portion of the population. This feature will engender broader
support among the population—to the extent this effect exists. Second, the benefit
is quite explicitly tied to work. Indeed, the reduction of hours of working time is
only available to those who work. Working-time regulation is thus an earned
benefit, available to those who contribute.
F. Efficiency
Another attribute often cited in favor of basic income is its efficiency.262
Basic income would generate at least two kinds of economic efficiency relative
to other or existing policies. The first efficiency is the savings created by simpler
administration.  The second derives from improved incentives in individuals’263
257. Klein, supra note 254.
258. See generally Anderson, supra note 119.
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Matthews, supra note 2. Skepticism of the universalism of basic income is also confirmed
when comparing it to an alternative proposal, the negative income tax. One could then propose that
instead of basic income, we adopt instead a negative income tax. 
262. See Liscow, supra note 24.
263. GUY STANDING, GLOBAL LABOUR FLEXIBILITY: SEEKING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 362-63
(1999) (writing that an unconditional basic income “would save on administration costs because
it would simplify the complex schemes, make them more transparent and reduce the amount of
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work-leisure choices.264
Let us start with administrative efficiency.  Under current welfare policies,265
current and potential recipients face a range of specific, sometimes in-kind
benefits—housing, food stamps, etc.—each with its own means test. Not only is
this time consuming and confusing for recipients, but staffing and processing
each of these programs also requires significant resources. Replacing these
welfare policies with basic income would eliminate nearly all of these
administrative costs. With a basic income, the only significant cost would be the
administration of the tax-revenue system (if basic income is financed in this
way)—a cost anyway under the current welfare regime.
A possibly more significant efficiency gain under basic income is its effect
on individuals’ work-leisure choices. Economists generally agree that tax and
welfare policies have some “distortionary” effects on individuals’ decision about
how much time to allocate between work and leisure.  To the extent that tax and266
welfare policies reduce the reward to work, we should expect people to
correspondingly choose more leisure over paid employment.  This effect of267
taxation is dubbed the “substitution” effect.  To the extent that this work-leisure268
trade-off differs from a hypothetical, perfectly competitive labor market, taxation
distorts an individual's economic choices.269
Proponents of basic income argue that it would significantly, if not vastly,
reduce the distortionary effects of current welfare policies.  As critics of welfare270
programs have long argued, means testing creates substantial disincentives to
work because earning more income can cause recipients to lose their welfare
intrusive enquiry”).
264. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 10-11, 12, 13, 14 (explaining how basic income removes
“unemployment trap” associated with traditional, means-tested welfare benefits).
265. For a critique of the claim of basic income’s administrative efficiency, see generally
Jurgen De Wispelaere & Lindsay Stirton, The Administrative Efficiency of Basic Income, 39 POL’Y
& POL. 115 (2011).
266. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE
OVER TAXES 121-22 (4th ed. 2008) (“[M]ost taxes, including income and consumption taxes, reduce
the marginal reward for working. Work [in contrast to leisure] becomes less attractive because
working that extra hour or taking on a second job buys fewer consumption goods and services. Put
differently, leisure and other nonmarket activities become more attractive . . . .”).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 122 (“The reduced after-tax return to working provides an incentive to substitute
more leisure and nonmarket endeavors for less work and less consumption of goods and services.
Economists call this impact of taxes the substitution effect . . . .”).
269. Id. at 120-21 (explaining “the baseline for measuring the economic cost of taxation is
how the economy would operate in the absence of any taxes . . . .” This hypothetical, perfectly
competitive market environment is defined as efficient and departures from it—for example, those
created by taxes—are distortionary, or inefficient.).
270. Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 10-14 (again, explaining how basic income removes the
“unemployment trap”).
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income.  The effect is no different than a sharp increase in the marginal tax rate271
as income rises.  In fact, economists analyze these means-testing discontinuities272
in precisely such language.  Therefore, current welfare policies discourage work273
and thereby generate significant economic loss.274
A basic income would entirely eliminate the distortionary substitution effects
of existing welfare policies. Because basic income is universal and unconditional,
its receipt does not depend on work choices or income.  It is even viewed as275
work-promoting by its advocates. According to Van Parijs, “Since you can keep
the full amount of your basic income, whether working or not, whether rich or
poor, you are bound to be better off when working than out of work.”276
Advocates of basic income thus view this feature as a major benefit. Van Parijs
in particular refers to the distortionary problem of welfare policy as the
“unemployment trap,” and writes that “[t]he abolition of the means test, as we
have seen, is intimately linked to the removal of the unemployment trap.”  To277
be sure, as all would acknowledge, distortions on the tax side would continue to
exist, but these prevail under existing policy in any case.
Despite these efficiency advantages, basic income also has the potential to
generate quite significant inefficiencies, as well. While, in the substitution effect,
basic income makes work relatively more valuable than leisure, basic income has
an additional effect, called the income effect.  The income effect is the effect278
that changes in income have, in this case, on consumption, including work and
leisure.  Everything equal, economists predict that an increase in income will279
lead individuals to increase their leisure to some extent.  In other words, with280
271. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and
Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 423-27 (1997) (explaining how the loss of welfare
benefits, as one moves up the income scale from longer work or a new job, effectively creates high
marginal tax increases and discourages work).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Nicole Maestas et al., Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work?
Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1797
(2013); Susan Chen & Wilbert van der Klaauw, The Work Disincentive Effects of the Disability
Insurance Program in the 1990s, 142 J. ECONOMETRICS 757 (2008); Janet E. Kodras, Labor-Market
and Policy Constraints on the Work Disincentive Effect of Welfare, 76 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 228 (1986).
275. Van Parijs, supra note 29.
276. Id. at 11.
277. Id. at 14.
278. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 266, at 122.
279. Id. (“Besides changing the marginal reward to working, most taxes make you poorer, and
when people are poorer, they tend to cut back at least a bit on all the things they value, including
leisure.”).
280. This is on the assumption that leisure is a normal good, defined as one that increases with
income (or wealth). If leisure were an inferior good, the amount of leisure would decrease as
income increases.
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an increase in income, people will need to work less to satisfy their consumption
preferences.  Even more intuitively, why would anyone work if the government281
provides her with a no-strings-attached income? Thus, by reducing the incentive
to work, basic income may also worsen economic efficiency, causing output to
drop beneath its optimal level.282
Whether basic income improves efficiency (via the substitution effect) or
worsens efficiency (via the income effect) is an empirical question. And, with
only limited research to bring to bear on this issue, it is difficult to definitively
answer. Nevertheless, two points are worth observing. First, advocates face a
dilemma when arguing on efficiency grounds. On the one hand, advocates tend
to minimize the concern raised by the income effect. They will point to studies
that support their view that basic income does not discourage people from
working.  On the other hand, advocates are much more enthusiastic about283
abolishing means testing and encouraging work along the lines of the substitution
effect.  But because both substitution and income effects are economic decisions284
made by the same individuals, it seems unlikely that advocates can have it both
ways. Either substitution and income effects will both be salient or they will both
not be.
The second point relates to the level of basic income. And in this case again,
advocates are caught in a thorny dilemma. Clearly, the level of the basic income
will have some effect on work incentives. At a high enough level, most people
will continue to work in only the most intrinsically rewarding jobs. Conversely,
at a sufficiently low level, we would expect work incentives to be only marginally
affected. At the same time, the benefits of basic income are precisely the opposite.
Basic income is most liberating at its most generous level, while least at its lowest
level. Basic income, therefore, faces some difficult trade-offs.285
We can now address the efficiency issues of working-time regulation. The
first thing to note is that administrating working-time regulation also entails costs.
The primary costs will be those of inspection and enforcement—the same types
of costs as currently exist under the FLSA.  How large these costs are depends286
partly on how effective the government and the public want the policy to be—a
281. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 266, at 122 (“Because the belt tightening of taxes causes
people to cut back on leisure, it causes people to work more than otherwise.”) (emphasis in
original). Conversely, an increase in income will cause individuals to increase leisure and reduce
work.
282. Most studies will show a minor decline in work effort. For a review, see Karl Widerquist
& Allan Sheahen, The United States: The Basic Income Guarantee—Past Experience, Current
Proposals, in BASIC INCOME WORLDWIDE: HORIZONS OF REFORM 11 (2012).
283. Porter, supra note 10.
284. Avraham et al., supra note 24, at 1145.
285. Van Parijs does squarely recognize this trade-off, writing, “The basic fact is that the more
material incentives one wishes to provide (for a given minimum income) to people earning at the
bottom of the earnings scale, the more one needs to decrease the material incentives higher up.”
Van Parijs, supra note 29, at 19.
286. On the enforcement of the FLSA, see CRAIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 782-84. 
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consideration no different than with basic income. One countervailing feature
with working-time regulation is the possibility of co-enforcement by secondary
associations.  Labor unions, worker centers, or works councils are the most287
relevant examples.  Although these methods are not themselves costless (for288
example, union activities are funded by member-paid union dues), their proximity
to workers and the workplace gives them better access to information, which
significantly lowers the cost of enforcement.  These features may make the289
enforcement of working-hours regulation cheaper than the administration of basic
income.
Both basic income and working-time regulation, therefore, entail
administrative costs, and it is not entirely clear nor obvious which is cheaper in
these terms. As such, neither constitutes a clearly superior policy choice.
However, the comparison is clearer when we consider other kinds of
economic efficiency. First, note that if labor markets are perfectly competitive,
any attempt to regulate working hours will be inefficient.  But with any290
departure from such a scenario, and in particular any imperfections in the way
working time is set, then there is scope for policy to increase efficiency.  The291
question, then, is just how competitive labor markets are. At first glance, they
would seem to be very competitive. Labor is relatively mobile, and therefore few
employers can exercise monopsony power.  Workers are typically free to sell292
their labor to several different employers.
But even with many potential buyers, there can exist substantial market
imperfections—which can give employers a kind of de facto monopsony
power.  When this is the case, employers will have an incentive to set the length293
287. See PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 152-61 (1990) (discussing the roles of
the government and labor unions in enforcing labor and employment laws and the drawbacks of
exclusively relying on the former).
288. See generally Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards
Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552 (2010).
289. Enforcement of various kinds of labor laws depend on the presence of a union at the
workplace. See, e.g., David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20,
20 (1991) (finding unionized firms were “more likely to receive safety and health inspections, face
greater scrutiny in the course of those inspections, and pay higher penalties for violating health and
safety standards than comparable nonunion establishments”).
290. This follows from the so-called first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which
says that when markets are complete, any competitive equilibrium is necessarily Pareto optimal.
ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 308 (1995). In this scenario, no regulation
can make any Pareto superior change.
291. See id. at 308-09 (listing the departures from perfect competition—market failures—that
justify Pareto-improving market interventions).
292. Whereas “monopoly” means “one seller,” “monopsony” means “one buyer.”
293. The White House’s Council of Economic Advisers recently issued a policy brief
discussing the sources of labor market monopsony to explain rising income inequality—both
between workers and between firms and workers. Sources of monopsony power in the labor market
include: (1) market concentration among firms, (2) employer collusion, (3) employer use of non-
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of the working day longer than employees prefer. At the same time, given the
imperfections in the market, employees will accept these less-than-preferred
terms because this is the best they can do. Economists would certainly debate the
existence and extent of labor market imperfections—just as they do in discussions
of the impact and efficiency of the minimum wage.  I cannot hope to resolve the294
debate in this Article; but one might point to the trend in working hours over the
last few decades as prima facie evidence of the inefficiency of setting working
hours in the labor market.  As the fall in working time has stalled or even295
reversed, even in the face of growing labor productivity, a simple interpretation
is that capital has gained the upper hand over labor in determining hours at
work.296
If labor market imperfections exist, and employers set hours longer than
employees prefer, then legislation that reduces working time will unambiguously
increase efficiency. Unlike basic income, there is no trade-off in terms of the
efficiency effects. This will be even more likely the case when labor-market
policy gives workers sufficient discretion over how much and when they choose
more leisure. When evaluating policies in terms of efficiency then, working-time
regulation stands as a clear winner.
G. The Environment
A final criterion by which we can evaluate basic income and working-time
regulation is their effects on the environment. There can be little doubt that
concerns about climate change and ecological sustainability are now foremost in
many peoples’ minds.  How social policy impacts the environment is thus an297
extremely crucial question.
It should first be noted that arguments for basic income are rarely, if ever,
linked to environmental concerns in any fundamental way.  Indeed, if anything,298
the prima facie case for basic income is anti-environment.  By increasing the299
compete agreements, (4) search costs and labor market frictions, (5) “job lock” and employer-
sponsored health insurance, and (6) regulatory barriers to worker mobility. See generally Council
of Economic Advisers Issue Brief, Labor Market Monopsony: Trends, Consequences, and Policy
Responses (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX9Z-3FNL].
294. For sources and research on labor market monopsony, see id.
295. SCHOR, supra note 89, at 28-34 (analyzing the rise in working hours).
296. Id. at 79-82.
297. To take simply a recent headline as evidence of this, see Lizette Alvarez & Frances
Robles, Intensified by Climate Change, ‘King Tides’ Change Ways of Life in Florida, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/intensified-by-climate-change-king-
tides-change-ways-of-life-in-florida.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y64Y-6YSP].
298. Jan Otto Andersson, Basic Income from an Ecological Perspective, 4 BASIC INCOME
STUD. 1, 2 (2009) (“In his treatise Real Freedom for All, Van Parijs . . . does not use ecologically
related arguments in favor of a [basic income].”).
299. Id. at 3. Andersson also notes that Van Parijs’ argument in Real Freedom for All “implies
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amount of income going to the poor—who are likely to spend, rather than save,
the entire amount—basic income is pro-consumption. To that extent, basic
income increases the resource burden on the environment. Thus, “One sees,
intuitively, a contradiction between soliciting an adequate unconditional [basic
income] and asking for an ecologically acceptable use of our environmental
resources.”  Indeed, many have frequently noted the puzzle of support for basic300
income by the Green movement. Van Parijs suggests that such support can be
explained by Green-movement members’ embrace of a “postmaterialist” values
orientation.  Yet he also observes that “a crucial—if not the crucial—argument301
for basic income must be that . . . basic income is growth-friendly.”302
That said, proponents of basic income with an ecological bent have suggested
ways of making basic income and concern for the environment more compatible.
Perhaps the most straightforward way of accomplishing this task is to finance
basic income out of “green taxes,” such as taxes on pollution or other
environmental public harms.  As Andersson observes, “A solution that curbs303
excessive consumption patterns and enhances the life chances of the poor at the
same time is superior to a scheme that is either purely redistributive or purely
eco-efficient without regard to distributive justice.”304
In contrast to basic income, the compatibility of working-time regulation and
environmental sustainability is much more straightforward.  By reducing305
working hours, working-time regulation can be a way of using increased
productivity to substitute leisure for consumption—or of outright reducing
production and consumption.  Indeed, several researchers have written about306
working-time regulation precisely as a means to reduce the resource burden on
the environment.
In a recent paper, Kyle W. Knight, Eugene A. Rosa, and Juliet B. Schor
empirically examine “the hypothesis that shorter working hours are significantly
associated with lower environmental pressures.”  They investigate two different307
pathways through which reduced working hours could lower pressure on the
that a [basic income] is likely to impose a burden on both the economy and the ecology.” Id.
300. Andersson, supra note 298, at 1.
301. Philippe Van Parijs, Competing Justifications for Basic Income, in PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS,
ARGUING FOR BASIC INCOME 3, 28 (Philippe Van Parijs ed., 1992). 
302. Id.
303. Andersson, supra note 298, at 5
304. Id.
305. See generally Juliet B. Schor, Sustainable Consumption and Worktime Reduction, 9 J.
INDUS. ECOLOGY 37 (2005) (arguing “it is difficult to imagine a globally ethical, timely, and
politically feasible resolution to the global ecological crisis in which populations in the North do
not reduce the number of hours worked per capita”).
306. Id.
307. Kyle W. Knight et al., Could Working Less Reduce Pressures on the Environment? A
Cross-National Panel Analysis of OECD Countries, 1970-2007, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 691,
691-92 (2013).
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environment.  They call the first pathway the “scale effect”: All else equal,308
shorter hours of work should reduce the scale of the economy.  The second309
pathway is called the “compositional effect.”  Working longer affects310
consumption patterns and leads to the consumption of goods and services that put
more pressure on the environment.  For instance, “Households with less time311
and more money will choose timesaving activities and products, such as faster
transportation, which are often more environmentally intensive.”  Using data for312
twenty-seven high-income OECD countries from 1970 through 2007, the authors
find strong empirical support for the first mechanism and moderate support for
the second.  Thus, there is evidence that shorter working hours can reduce313
pressure on the environment.
The conclusion is that if one wants to promote greater free time for workers
and reduce pressure on the environment, working-time regulation offers a far
more preferable choice than basic income in achieving these objectives.
CONCLUSION
As explored in this Article, basic income has many desirable attributes. As
this Article has also demonstrated, working-hours regulation surpasses, or at least
achieves, what basic income does, evaluated on these same attributes. Given the
choice, this Article recommends that further attention, research, and promotion
be given to working-time regulation than to basic income. But is such a choice
necessary? Why not adopt both basic income and working-time regulation? As
alluded to in the introduction, there are many reasons for why adopting both may
not be feasible. First, the accomplishment of either would be a substantial
political achievement. Legislating either would require considerable political
resources, mobilization, and capital. Asking for both would in many countries
place unreasonable demands on those resources. There is also the problem of
“institutional complementarities” mentioned in the introduction. The expectation
of employment is built into most existing welfare-state policies. A reform of
working-time regulation—premised on work—would complement those existing
policies. In contrast, basic income would mark a substantial change in welfare-
state policy. Not only does this make basic income more difficult to achieve, but
it also makes it more uncertain in its consequences. Finally, there is also the
argument of political feasibility. Working-time regulation merely involves a
modification—more or less substantial depending on the actual version
adopted—to an already existing set of policies.  Again, depending on the314
version adopted, the tax revenues required for such a change could be quite
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 694.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Matthews, supra note 2.
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modest. In contrast, the adoption of basic income would involve enormous
revenue costs. Even granting each citizen in the United States a modest basic
income of $10,000 per year would amount to $3 trillion annually.  Federal315
spending on current welfare programs amounts in comparison to around $600
billion.  Put another way, a basic income would cost five times as much as316
current welfare spending. For many commentators, this fact alone is sufficient to
end any serious discussion about the political possibilities of a basic income in
the United States.
In short, the normative desirability of a policy is not always sufficient to
ensure its success. Basic income may well be viable—even feasible. But working-
time regulation can achieve nearly all that we would want from basic
income—and do so on a broader, more egalitarian basis. Given that, and the
modest political constraints on policy, the choice between basic income and
working-time regulation is real, relevant, and augurs in favor of the latter.
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